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SADOMASOCHISTIC JUDGING
LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. 2018. Pp. xii + 221. $41.00 (Cloth).
David Schraub1
What makes a judicial decision legitimate? Common answers
include fidelity to legal texts and precedent, coherence to natural or
intersubjectively agreed upon norms, or endorsement from
democratically accountable actors. But while these criteria each
have strong theoretical appeal, their practical usefulness as a means
of validating any contested judicial decision is often limited. In
cases of legal indeterminacy or the proverbial “hard cases,” many
different outcomes can at least claim to fulfill these requirements. A
decision which genuinely fulfills legitimacy criteria and one which
is merely going through the motions often will be observationally
equivalent.
As a means of practically establishing legal legitimacy in a way
verifiable to external observers, pain is an underappreciated but
important element of judicial practice. Judges routinely brag of
rendering decisions which are painful to them—upholding
“uncommonly silly laws,” protecting “speech that we hate,”
reluctantly permitting terrible injustices to persist because the law
“ties our hands.” Far from being relegated to the embarrassed
fringes, such cases play a central role in establishing judges as
legitimate actors bound by law, and in many ways represent the
demarcation line between good and bad judges—a good judge is
one who does not flinch even in the face of great pain. Yet it should
* Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Assistant Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark University (starting Fall 2021).
Thanks to Bill Araiza, Wayne Batchis, Rachel Bayefsky, Emily Berman, Michael
Gentithes, Daniel Greenwald, André LeDuc, Vincent Samar, Miguel Schor, Eric Segall,
Wanling Su, Evan Zoldan, and commenters at the Loyola University (Chicago)
Constitutional Law Colloquium for helpful feedback.
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be clear that there is great risk in tying the validation of judges to
the infliction and receipt of pain. To the extent judges are socialized
into associating pain with legitimacy, the legal system that emerges
will likely be one which needlessly and gratuitously inflicts pain.
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Judge Richard Kopf of the District of Nebraska
levied a powerful warning for aspiring federal judges. He asked
them to ask themselves: “Am I a willing judicial executioner, a
person who consciously does great harm to other human beings
by faithfully executing the extraordinarily harsh national criminal
laws?” The question, Judge Kopf continued, gets at a painful
truth: “When sentencing people, federal trial judges literally and
consciously destroy lives and most do so on a daily basis.” “Those
who covet a federal trial judgeship,” he advised, “should think
hard about this truth before pursuing the job.”2
It’s good advice. This reality of judging—the necessity of
inflicting pain as a daily feature of the job—is one all judicial
candidates should reflect upon. On the other hand, we probably
don’t want judges who, after pondering whether they can serve as
a “willing judicial executioner,” answer with a hearty and cheerful
affirmative. Perhaps the moral of the story is that the best judges
are perpetually miserable.
Richard Fallon’s book Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme
Court does not spend much time considering the emotional wellbeing of judges—their happiness or sadness. Its focus is, as the
name implies, on questions of legitimacy in judicial decisionmaking. “By what moral right” does the United States Supreme
Court “establish controversial rules of law . . . and then enforce its
dictates coercively? Or, perhaps better, How [sic] would the
Supreme Court of the United States need to decide the cases
before it—both procedurally and substantively—in order to
justify imposing its will on those who reasonably disagree with its
conclusions . . . ?” (p. 7).

2. Richard Kopf, Want Ad: A Judicial Executioner to Serve for a Lifetime,
HERCULES & THE UMPIRE (Sept. 30, 2013), https://herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/09/30
/want-ad-a-judicial-executioner-to-serve-for-a-lifetime/. Judge Kopf’s words also evoke
Robert Cover’s bracing declaration that “judges deal pain and death.” Robert Cover,
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609 (1986).

SCHRAUB 35:3

2020]

12/29/2020 11:21 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

439

Yet the paradox of the miserable judge has more relevance
to the question of legal legitimacy than might be apparent at first
glance. It is not just that judges inflict pain as part of their daily
job. It is more fundamental than that: judges inflict pain and
thereby validate and legitimize their job. A judge who is charged
to be simply a tyrant in a robe, maximizing her own policy
preferences while dressing it all up in legalese, will instinctively
rejoin by citing all the cases where she would have preferred to
rule in a different way, was agonized by what the law compelled
her to do, but nonetheless acted in accordance with it. In a very
real sense, it is these “painful” decisions—the ones judges hate,
the ones where they palpably and vocally wince and squirm, the
ones which cause or sanction obvious harm and injury that goes
beyond what seems fair or justifiable as a matter of pure ethics—
that are the most important to establishing judges as constrained
by law and therefore legitimate. In this way, the question of
legitimation becomes inextricably bound up with questions of
pain—the judge who inflicts pain and who reflexively feels pain in
return.
Part I offers an introduction by assessing Fallon’s approach
to the judicial legitimation project as a means of distinguishing
truly “legal” decisions from mere judicial caprice. While
theoretically rigorous, it suffers because many of the features
which putatively distinguish licit versus lawless judging are
difficult if not impossible to observe and so cannot actually serve
to legitimate any particular judicial decision in a universe where
essentially all contested judicial decisions are at least plausibly
legalistic.
Part II suggests that pain appears to offer a viable means of
observationally confirming that a judicial decision genuinely
stems from legalistic commitments—the decision that the judge is
pained to hand down, generally because it causes unjust pain to
others, is presumptively legitimate insofar as the judge has no
other reason to make such a ruling but because he or she is legally
compelled to do so. Of course, conceptually the only true
connection between pain and legitimate judicial decision-making
is one of compatibility: a decision can be painful and still
legitimate. Yet—precisely because it appears to offer the elusive
guarantee of judicial legitimacy—pain can easily become viewed
as a heuristic for or even constitutive of legitimate judging. Judges
come to sadomasochistically crave pain and the legitimacy it
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provides, seeking out pain and reveling in the painful outcomes
even when they are not demanded by the law.
Part III concludes by exploring the degree to which the
judiciary today can be described as engaging in sadomasochistic
judging. After the 2016 election, there were some predictions that
the Supreme Court would serve as a check against extreme abuses
by the Trump administration—expectations premised on the
(likely true) assumption that even most conservative judges were
not “Trumpist” in their personal beliefs. Instead, over the course
of the Trump administration the Supreme Court in particular has
not just handed repeated victories to the administration, it has
taken extraordinary steps—often in the cases (particularly
surrounding immigration) in which the Trump administration’s
cruelties are at their apex—to intervene on the administration’s
behalf in manners that circumvent the ordinary appellate review
process. That the Court is wielding not just its purely legal analytic
power but also its discretionary power (e.g., over when to grant
certiorari, stays, injunctions, and so on) in these cases—and seems
if anything more inclined to do so in cases where the judges might
be thought to be most squeamish about the tangible outcomes of
the decision—cries out for explanation. While it is possible that it
simply reflects a basic policy affinity between the justices and the
administration on these issues, it may actually stem from the
opposite instinct: the sense that a good judge, a legitimate judge,
is one who does not shy away from his or her duty in the face of
pain; a suspicion that (lower court) judges who arrest pain are
shirking this duty; and the conclusion that the rule of law demands
if anything greater attention and scrutiny to those cases and
rulings where courts are avoiding pain—and thereby, potentially,
avoiding their judicial duty.
I. LEGAL LEGITIMACY VERSUS JUDICIAL CAPRICE
Fallon introduces his book by recalling a remark from Justice
Brennan that “the most important number in the Supreme Court
is five.” Why? Because “[w]ith five votes, you can do anything”
(p. x).3 Justice Brennan was no doubt speaking somewhat tongue
in cheek. Nonetheless, he was evoking one of the recurrent fears

3. Later on, Fallon quotes Charles Evans Hughes making a similar point: “the
Constitution is what the judges say it is” (p. 105).
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surrounding the exercise of judicial power—that it is naught but
the caprice of a judicial majority, that given a panel majority
judges are free to simply do anything they like.4 Judicial legitimacy
is meant as a conceptual check against this vision of terrifying
judicial freedom-as-tyranny.5
One potential mechanism for constraining judges—ensuring
that they decide based on law, and not their own subjective
whim—is attempting to formulate a constitutional theory that
minimizes if not eliminates indeterminacy. If there is only one
correct outcome to any potential case or controversy, and that
outcome is fairly discernable by a suitably well-trained legal
observer, then a judge who deviates from the one true path can
be immediately recognized as a rogue or usurper. Originalism
often holds itself out as providing such legal determinacy,6 though
Fallon is deeply skeptical that it succeeds in its aspiration (pp.
137–142).
But Fallon makes the more expansive argument that “the
very ambition of developing a perfectly determinate
constitutional theory should strike us as misguided—indeed, as
terrifyingly so” (p. 141). A perfectly determinate judicial theory
always runs the risk of compelling “practically and morally

4. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293 (1992) (“Constitutional theory in the last several
decades has been obsessed with the question of how to constrain judges’ exercise of
will, . . . try[ing] to refute accusations that judges are simply expressing their own subjective
preferences when they interpret the Constitution.”).
5. The capacity to command while being absolutely free from the commands of
others is the marker of sovereignty under an early modern tradition dating from Jean
Bodin and continuing through Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau—an
understanding which has generated considerable worry that their theories are simply
apologies for tyranny. Under this view, judicial supremacy—where judges get the
effectively the “last word” on interpretations of law, immune from reproach by the
democratic branches—might be thought to strip sovereignty from the people and place it
in the hands of unelected judges. But as I have argued elsewhere, a more careful reading
of the Bodin/Hobbes/Rousseau tradition would adhere to the distinction between
sovereignty and government, locating the former not in any of the branches of government
but in the residual—and unlimited—constitution-making authority that remains in the
hands of the people. See David Schraub, Finding the “Sovereign” in “Sovereign Immunity”:
Lessons from Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau, 29 CRIT. REV. 388 (2017).
6. Fallon cites KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 61–62 (1999); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); and Stephen E. Sachs,
Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015). Fallon
criticizes the latter, in particular, in detail (p. 204 n.7).
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disastrous outcomes,” and few are willing to actually endorse
these consequences simply because theory demands it (p. 141).
This is the force of Michael McConnell’s famous concession that
“if any particular [constitutional] theory does not produce the
conclusion that Brown [v. Board of Education] was correctly
decided, the theory is seriously discredited” (p. 145).7 Just as
Anatole France suggested that “to die for an idea is to place a
pretty high price on conjecture,” in law, Fallon observes, “the
stakes are too high” to tie oneself to “an advance, let-the-chipsfall-where-they-may
commitment”
to
a
determinate
constitutional theory (p. 141).
Seeking to avoid both the dangers of utterly unconstrained,
whim-based judging as well as rigid, algorithmic determinacy,
Fallon lands upon an application of John Rawls’ famous concept
of the “reflective equilibrium.”8 Rawls promoted the reflective
equilibrium as a mechanism for developing and fine-tuning
principles of political justice. In short, Rawls observes that
humans have convictions regarding both broad principles and
specific cases of justice. Ideally, these convictions are in
harmony—that is, application of the general principles yields the
outcomes we intuitively understand to be “just” in essential cases.
In practice, there will likely be discrepancies: circumstances where
application of the principles does not lead to the results we would
have expected based on our pre-investigative notions of justice.
In those circumstances, we have two choices: we can revise our
case-specific judgments to align with the theory, or we can revise
the theory so that it generates the desired results.9
Either move is, or can be, appropriate. Certainly, in many
cases where application of a principle requires an outcome that
the deliberator did not as an initial matter endorse, the proper
moral decision is nonetheless to adhere to the principle. After all,
that’s what principles are for. A deliberator who only adhered to
their stated moral principles in cases where they agreed with the
outcome could hardly be said to be bound by principles in the first
place. Yet, it is equally clear that in some cases, the fact that the
principle demands an especially appalling or unacceptable
7. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 952 (1995).
8. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 48–51 (1971).
9. Id. at 20.
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outcome is taken to indict the validity of the principle itself. For
how do we assess which principles deserve our allegiance but by
checking to see if they successfully generate desirable (or at least
tolerable) states of the world? It hardly can be the case that we
are duty-bound to follow a “principle” which, as applied to a
specific social fact pattern, turned out to demand “genocide,”
“slavery,” or “extinction-level environmental damage,” even if we
had all nominally agreed to the principle in advance.
As in justice, so too in law—or so Fallon argues. Contrary to
the belief of some, judges should not ascend to the bench
committed to a set of legal principles which they then must cling
to come hell or high water (pp. 126–127). While judges should
have at least “provisional” commitment to a particular
interpretive theory, and should be willing to revise case-specific
judgments to cohere to that theory, in certain cases judges should
be willing to make adjustments on the side of principle, not just
the side of outcomes. Like in deliberations about justice, a
mismatch between one’s overarching interpretive principles and
one’s intuitions regarding legal outcomes might normally suggest
revising one’s stance on the outcome, but in the right
circumstances truly intolerable outcomes might call into question
the robustness of the principle. Once we reject the simplistic
notion, whereby we are powerless subjects of the founding
generation, we must embrace “the role and responsibility . . . in
maintaining and possibly reshaping the constitutional order” (p.
87). The notion of being fully bound and constrained interferes
with our practical—and unavoidable—role in creating
constitutional meaning.
So, if judges cannot be strictly bound to rigid and previouslyagreed to interpretive theories, what makes judicial decisions
legitimate? How must the judiciary “decide the cases that come
before it—both procedurally and substantively—in order to
justify imposing its will on those who reasonably disagree with its
conclusions?” (p. 7). Fallon offers three basic “considerations”
that judges must adhere to in order to maintain legitimacy in cases
of sharp contestation:
1) They “must stay within the bounds of law,” or at least within
the realm of reasonable judgment about what the bounds of
the law permit;
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2) They must exhibit reasonable practical and moral judgment;
and
3) They must support decisions via arguments made in “good
faith” (p. 11).

These are indeed good guidelines for judges to follow. And it
seems clear that considerations such as these generate at least
some internal motivation that in practice constrains judicial
behavior. Even judges who disavow explicit or rigidly mechanistic
constitutional theorizing almost certainly “deny the
appropriateness of deciding on whim” (p. 132). As Fallon
observes, judges not only “feel bound by, and seek to obey and
enforce, legal rules” but also “seek to hold each other to norms of
proper conduct” vis-à-vis legal requirements (p. 93). Indeed, to
some extent the judicial power depends for its very authority on
the understanding that judges are limited as interpreters of duly
enacted law. If there were no publicly accepted notion of legal and
constitutional constraints that serve to effectively bind judges, the
result would not be “constitutionally unconstrained Justices” but
rather the absence of any figures recognized as judges at all (pp.
106–107).
The problem, of course, is that these norm-bound limits on
judicial conduct are extremely fuzzy, as Fallon admits and indeed,
in some ways, depends upon (for example, in insisting that we
“not take too exacting or unforgiving a stance” in evaluating
whether judges have failed to stay within the bounds of the law or
exhibited reasonable practical and moral judgment) (p. 11). The
cases that illustrate a failure to abide by these considerations—
Fallon offers the example of an interlocutor who admits that an
argument they made before that they now contradict was made
“only for rhetorical purposes, without really believing it” (p. 12,
see also p. 130)—are extreme, and unlikely to manifest in reality.
Few of the controversial Supreme Court cases that generate
anxiety about legitimacy will involve judicial conduct that
decisively evinces an utter failure to stay within the bounds of law,
catastrophic collapses of moral or practical judgment, or
tauntingly brazen refusals to offer “good faith” arguments for a
given legal position.10
10. Indeed, a large part of the problem is that even judicial opinions which seemingly
fail Fallon’s test often will not read as so failing—the judge who makes an argument in bad
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This fuzziness generates a crisis at the core of the judicial
legitimation project. Leslie Moran describes the dilemma well:
When the language and the rules of the law are shown to be
incapable of either providing clear guidelines or imposing strict
limits upon action, the law begins to appear as a practice that is
not so much a thing in opposition to violence but as a practice
that has many characteristics that have been associated with
violence. Thus law appears now as an arbitrary practice of
domination rather than a practice controlled by language, rule
and reason. Without the guidance arising from an authentic
source of law, decision making might get out of hand. Without
rule or reason judicial practice appears to be a practice without
a referee or a controller. Legal practice no longer appears to be
benign and impartial controlled by the rigorous demands of
language, rule or reason but appears to be a practice of cocoercion more closely associated with the whim of those who
have access to it.11

Judicial supremacy, coupled with the potential limitless
power implied by the importance of “counting to five,” renders
judges deeply anxious about their seemingly unbounded and
unending freedom—a freedom that can easily tilt into tyranny.
This anxiety manifests as a need for legitimacy that is both
internally and externally imposed: internally, because judges
genuinely are uncomfortable with the prospect that they,
personally, should possess so much power given their relative lack
of democratic accountability, and externally, because in order for
the judicial power to have practical effect in a system where they
lack both power of the sword or the purse12 their decision-making
needs to be viewed as legitimate.
The crux of the dilemma is this: In order to be legitimated,
judicial action must be understood to derive from authoritative
legal sources that are not reducible to the simple whim and caprice
of the presiding judge or panel majority. Otherwise it is scarcely
distinguishable from capricious violence—impotent if it fails,
tyrannical if it succeeds. Yet distinguishing between those
faith will nonetheless, if she is halfway competent, be able to dress it up in language that
at least plausibly respects the standards of good faith and reasonable judgment. This goes
to the broader point regarding the need for something which observationally distinguishes
“good” and “bad” judicial practices. See infra Part II.A.
11. Leslie J. Moran, Violence and the Law: The Case of Sado-Masochism, 4 SOC. &
LEGAL STUD. 225, 234 (1995).
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R Pole ed., 2005).
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decisions which are authentically generated from law and those
which are not is by no means straightforward. And so, Fallon asks,
“In a world in which no one has perfect factual knowledge and in
which we must anticipate and respect legal and moral
disagreement, how do we mark the boundaries of legitimate
judicial decision making?” (p. 125).
II. SADOMASOCHISTIC JUDGING
A. PAIN AS A SIGNAL OF LEGITIMATE JUDGING
In order to escape this dilemma, judges need ways to credibly
signal that they are acting within the bounds of law. And in order
to be effective, these signals must in some way serve to render
observationally distinct those decisions which are genuinely
generated from and are bounded by legal constraints from actions
by judges that manage to follow proper legal forms even as they
are actually motivated by or in pursuit of extra-legalistic interests.
But now we run into another serious problem: there are very
few markers which facially distinguish these two sorts of cases.
When Fallon dismisses the arrogant judge who simply declares
“[m]y methodology is just to follow the law,” as either “being
mistaken, misleading, or possibly [speaking] in bad faith” (p. 133),
he is alluding to this point—the non-obviousness of what decisions
are and are not examples of “just following the law.” Even to
educated observers steeped in the legal tradition, the lawful and
lawless ruling may look remarkably alike.
In 1950, Karl Llewellyn observed that virtually any wellrespected canon of statutory construction has an equally
venerable counter-canon pointing in the precise opposite
direction. Each of these—canon and counter-canon, “thrust and
parry”—carries a perfectly sound legal pedigree and plausible
basis in legal theory.13 These contradictory canons probably do
not allow judges to do anything they desire. But they do vastly
expand the number of legal readings which can plausibly call
themselves correct “as a matter of law.”14 A judge who seeks to
drape his or her whim in plausible legal garb will not lack for
13. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
14. Id. at 395 (“One does not progress far into legal life without learning that there
is no single right and accurate way of reading one case, or of reading a bunch of cases.”).
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choices. Many years later, Philip Bobbitt discussed the various
“modalities” of constitutional interpretation (e.g., textual,
historical, doctrinal, prudential), which for any given legal
question can each point to different plausible legal answers (p.
135).15 Here too, there are opportunities for “legal” and “whimbased” judging to observationally converge—in few cases will no
legal modality be available to a judge looking to justify a
contentious ruling or holding. And the effect of precedent and
prior practice, far from “liquidating” or otherwise settling
constitutional meaning, can have the practical effect of further
fragmenting it: each decision and each instance of practice
proliferates the number of facially legitimate threads offering
“eligible foundations for modern Court decisions” (p. 80).
Even in circumstances where we now know that anything
resembling “law” took a subordinate stance to authoritarian
power—such as judicial decisions involving Black litigants in the
Jim Crow South—the rancid, racist lawlessness we associate with
that state of affairs was not typically marked on the body of the
text. Cases involving Black litigants that came before southern
courts in fact look exceedingly normal in their manner of
presenting evidence, citing precedents, and working through legal
reasoning. Consider the Scottsboro cases. These are generally
portrayed as an attempted “legalized lynching” by the Alabama
judiciary,16 checked only by two successive Supreme Court
interventions in Powell v. Alabama17 and Norris v. Alabama.18 In
context, that assessment is perfectly accurate. But the opinions of
the Alabama Supreme Court, affirming the convictions
nonetheless are styled in perfectly ordinary, prosaic legal prose.19
They make arguments, cite relevant precedents, engage with the
dissenting opinion filed by Chief Justice John C. Anderson,20 and

15. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991).
16. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing
Equality?, 102 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1458 (2016).
17. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing convictions based on denial of counsel).
18. 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (reversing convictions based on systemic exclusion of Blacks
from the juror selection process).
19. See, e.g., Norris v. State, 156 So. 556 (Ala. 1934); Patterson v. State, 141 So. 195
(Ala. 1932); Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala. 1932); Weems v. State, 141 So. 215 (Ala.
1932).
20. Indeed, the fact that there was a dissenting opinion at all might be thought to
further falsify the notion that a Black criminal defendant in a rape case would
automatically lose his appeal in the Alabama judiciary without any substantive review.
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otherwise look remarkably similar to criminal law decisions issued
by state appellate courts today.
There is, however, one type of decision which—on face at
least—can plausibly claim to result only from a judge “following
the law” rather than his or her own personal moral or policy
preferences. In certain cases, judges (credibly) express anguish or
distress at what they are “forced” to do by law. These are
“painful” judgments; they by stipulation entail a judge
announcing a ruling whose results they do not wish to impose
upon the world, carrying consequences which they are
uncomfortable with or even abhor. But precisely they are so
painful, they seemingly cannot be motivated by anything but
adherence to the law. Hence, perhaps paradoxically, these painful
decisions carry the strongest claim to legal legitimacy and do the
most work in establishing that judges are actually and not just
nominally constrained by law. Put differently: the legitimacy
problem posed by Justice Brennan’s “five votes” remark assumes
that the alternative to legitimate judicial practice is one where
judges just do whatever makes them happy. So what better proof
that they’re not doing that than decisions where they do things
that bring them pain?
Judges love bragging about painful cases as visible
demonstrations of their fealty to rule of law commitments. Why
else would a judge issue such a ruling unless they were bound to
do it? The pain offers up a form of martyrdom, for, as Robert
Cover writes, “the miracle of the suffering of the martyrs is their
insistence on the law to which they are committed, even in the
face of world-destroying pain.”21 And if nothing else, we respect
the martyrs, even when we may not endorse the cause upon which
they offer their sacrifice. Consider the dissent in Griswold v.
Moreover, Chief Justice Anderson’s dissent was actually quite vigorous. He attacked
the “pro forma” representation the defendants received, Powell, 141 So. at 214 (Anderson,
C.J., dissenting), noted that the universally-imposed death sentence on every defendant
suggested that the defendants cases were not assessed individually or with any reflective
appraisal of distinguishing features between the various defendants (on account of age,
leadership, or other factors), id. at 215, and insisted that the trial should have been delayed
until “after some months of cooling time have elapsed” to ensure that a fair decision could
be reached, id. In a particularly striking passage, given the context of the times, Anderson
even went out of his way to note that each defendant was “a human being” and therefore
was entitled to “a fair and impartial trial” as well as a penalty (if found guilty) that “an
impartial jury, unawed by outside pressure, may under the law inflict upon him.” Id.
21. Cover, supra note 2, at 1604.
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Connecticut, where Justice Stewart voted to affirm the
constitutionality of what he called an “uncommonly silly law”
prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to married couples.22 This
dissent is famous and generally well-respected with the legal
profession—somewhat remarkably, given the ferocity with which
Griswold itself is today defended against attempts to overturn or
delegitimize it.
Free speech is another arena where judges validate their
decisions based on the pain that they cause—to themselves and to
others. In Texas v. Johnson, striking down bans on flag
desecration, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]he hard fact is that
sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them
because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the
Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.”23 Flag burning is
protected by the Constitution, “however painful this judgment is
to announce.”24 In another First Amendment case, upholding the
right of a private club to have sex-discriminatory admissions rules,
Judge Richard Arnold wrote that “if, in the phrase of Justice
Holmes, the First Amendment protects ‘the thought that we hate,’
it must also, on occasion, protect the association of which we
disapprove.”25 Even though this decision was ultimately reversed
by the Supreme Court,26 it was nonetheless flagged by Richard
Garnett (one of Judge Arnold’s former clerks) as an example of
“constitutional courage” for which he “deserves praise.”27 Indeed,
Professor Garnett devoted the entirety of a later tribute article to
a defense of Judge Arnold’s Jaycees opinion.28
Appeals to the legitimating power of pain appear very early
in the history of the American judiciary, and I suspect this is no
accident. When the judiciary’s powers vis-à-vis the other branches
remained unestablished and relatively untested, it was especially
important to confirm that judicial action was not simply a cloaked

22. 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
23. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 421.
25. U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1561 (8th Cir. 1983).
26. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
27. Richard W. Garnett, Tribute to the Honorable Richard Sheppard Arnold for His
Service as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 185, 212 (1999).
28. Richard W. Garnett, Jaycees Reconsidered: Judge Richard S. Arnold and the
Freedom of Association, 58 ARK. L. REV. 587 (2005).
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attempt by the justices to assert raw political power.29 In
Hayburn’s Case, decided over ten years before Marbury v.
Madison, the Supreme Court intimated at least the possibility of
reviewing the constitutionality of federal laws, but did so couched
in language of how wrenching such an act would be. The Court
extensively quoted a letter written jointly by Justice Iredell and
North Carolina Federal District Court Judge John Sitgreaves,
where they stated that “we never can find ourselves in a more
painful situation than to be obliged to object to the execution of
any [legislative act], more especially to the execution of one
founded on the purest principles of humanity and justice, which
the act in question undoubtedly is.”30
The Marshall court picked up this language of pain, using it
to validate expansions of judicial power even as it supposedly
demonstrated the continued allegiance of the judiciary to the law
and Constitution. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court
reaffirmed its prerogative to strike down unconstitutional federal
acts, observing that “[s]hould Congress, in the execution of its
powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution;
or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted
to the government; it would become the painful duty of this
tribunal . . . to say that such an act was not the law of the land.”31
Cohens v. Virginia provides an even starker example. Chief
Justice Marshall, establishing the authority of the Supreme Court
to review and reverse state court judgments on matters of federal

29. The anti-federalists warned that judges who are “independent of the people, of
the legislature, and of every power under heaven,” will “soon feel themselves independent
of heaven itself.” Brutus XV, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 438 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981).
30. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409, 410 n.+ (1792) (reprinting the letter of the Circuit
Court for the District Pennsylvania to President Washington).
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819). Critics of the McCulloch
decision, who were convinced that the Marshall Court would not strike down federal laws
in circumstances where they impinged upon states’ rights (as the National Bank was
alleged to do), mocked this passage—but they did so because “[t]he latitude of their
construction [in McCulloch] will render it unnecessary for them to discharge a duty so
‘painful’ to their feelings,” i.e., because they were skeptical that the Marshall Court would
in fact take on the “painful” (to them) duty of constraining federal power. A Virginian’s
“Amphictyon” Essays (1819), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH
V. MARYLAND 75 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). See Kurt T. Lash, “Tucker’s Rule”: St.
George Tucker and the Limited Construction of Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1343, 1377–78 (2006), for discussion.
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constitutional law, wrote:
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure
because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We
cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts,
with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must
decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp
that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason
to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would
gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to
exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty. In doing this, on the present occasion, we find this
tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising
under the constitution and laws of the United States.32

Once again, the claimed authority to assert jurisdiction over
state courts—an assertion sure to rankle the state judiciaries and
states’ rights enthusiasts more generally—was cast as a painful
decision, something the Court did not relish but rather was
compelled to take on due to the mandates of law and the
Constitution. A decade later, Joseph Story generalized the notion.
The judicial branch, he wrote, is burdened by “the constant
necessity of scrutinizing the acts of [the other branches] . . . and
the painful duty of pronouncing judgment, that these acts are a
departure from the law or constitution. . . .”33 Even today,
commentators draw on Cohens and Justice Story to speak of “the
Article III judge’s duty, upon pain of ‘treason to the Constitution,’
to apply the whole supreme law, no matter how ‘painful,’
‘difficult,’ or ‘doubtful’ doing so might be.”34
The capacity of pain as a means of validating judicial practice
continues to play a powerful role in discourse by and about the
judiciary. In Mitchell v. Roberts, the Utah Supreme Court
considered a statute which retroactively extended the statute of
limitation for child sex abuse claims that had lapsed as of 2016.35
The Court concluded that the statute violated the original
32. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
33. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 542, at 391 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 2008).
34. James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity
and Quality of Decision-Making Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696,
861 (1998).
35. 2020 UT 24 (2020); see Utah Code § 78B-2-308(7), invalidated by Mitchell v.
Roberts, 2020 UT 24 (Utah 2020).
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meaning of the Utah Constitution, notwithstanding the “heartwrenching” facts of the case and the Utah legislature’s
“reasonable policy basis” that those abused as children may take
decades “to pull their lives back together and find the strength to
face what happened to them” and require a reprieve from normal
statute of limitations rules.36 But, the Court continued, “our oath
is to support, obey, and defend the constitution,” and judges are
bound to enforce the rules of the constitution “whether or not we
endorse its dictates as a policy matter.”37 Writing on this decision,
Josh Blackman favorably commented that “A good gut check for
originalism”—and, we might add, any theory of constitutional
interpretation—“is whether a decision leads to results you
disagree with. Here, the Utah Supreme Court passed that gut
check.”38
Perhaps the most prominent articulation of pain as a
legitimator of judicial decision-making emerged in the
confirmation hearings for then-Judge Neil Gorsuch’s nomination
to the United States Supreme Court. Critics had seized upon one
of Judge Gorsuch’s dissents, in the so-called “frozen trucker”
case, in an attempt to demonstrate his inflexibility and/or extreme
deference to employer power.39 The facts of the case are stark: the
plaintiff, a commercial truck driver for TransAm, experienced
catastrophic brake failure on his trailer while driving in sub-zero
temperatures. He was instructed by his employer to remain with
the trailer and await assistance. Unfortunately, his truck’s heating
unit also failed and—after three hours of waiting in vain for a
promised repair vehicle, during which his feet and torso went
numb—the driver unhitched the trailer and attempted to drive to
safety. He was then fired by his employer for abandoning his
vehicle.40
The locus of the case was whether or not the trucker’s
decision to abandon his trailer constituted “refus[ing] to operate
a vehicle” due to “a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to
36. 2020 UT 24, at ¶¶ 6, 52.
37. Id. at ¶¶ 51–52.
38. Josh Blackman, Originalism in the State Courts: Justice Tom Lee of the Utah
Supreme Court on the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Volokh Conspiracy
(June 18, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/06/18/originalism-in-the-state-courts-justice-tomlee-of-the-utah-supreme-court-on-the-due-process-clause-of-the-utah-constitution/.
39. TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 833 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2016).
40. Id. at 1208–09 (introducing the factual background of this case).
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the employee or the public because of the vehicle’s hazardous
safety or security condition.”41 The court majority (alongside the
OSHA administrative law judge and the OSHA’s administrative
review board) concluded that it was.42 Judge Gorsuch dissented,
contending that the trucker had not refused to operate a vehicle
but “chose instead to operate his vehicle in a manner he thought
wise but his employer did not.”43
In his dissent, Judge Gorsuch did express sympathy for the
driver, describing his employer’s ultimatum as “legal if
unpleasant” and conceding that “[i]t might be fair to ask whether
TransAm’s decision was a wise or kind one.”44 “But,” he
continued, “it’s not our job to answer questions like that. Our only
task is to decide whether the decision was an illegal one.”45
Challenged by Senators Al Franken and Mazie Hirono during his
confirmation hearing, Judge Gorsuch said twice of the trucker
that “my heart goes out to him,” and (to Senator Hirono)
continued by saying that “I said that in the opinion that he was
put in a rotten position. And I go home at night with cases where
sometimes the law requires results that I personally would not
prefer.”46 Consequently, Gorsuch’s backers sought to present his
“frozen trucker” decision as modeling the sort of judicial behavior
that should be rewarded via elevation to the Supreme Court,
precisely because it conflicted with Gorsuch’s (and everyone
else’s) moral intuitions.47 Senator Thom Tillis suggested that “my
guess is when you rode home that night, you wished that” the
statutory text would justify an alternate conclusion. But, he went
on to say, “[y]ou are not here to have a heart. You are here to
interpret and apply the law.”48
41. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B).
42. TransAm, 833 F.3d at 1214.
43. Id. at 1216 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1215 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 171, 222 (2017) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing].
47. John Murdock, Why the “Frozen Trucker” Case Makes Me Like Judge Gorsuch
More, STREAM (Mar. 24, 2017), https://stream.org/frozen-trucker-case-makes-like-judgegorsuch/ (“I would prefer to have on the Supreme Court [a judge] who is willing to endure
a frustrating but legally correct result over someone who takes it upon himself to right
every wrong according his own moral compass. Neil Gorsuch appears to be just such a
disciplined justice.”).
48. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 46, at 235.
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B. PAIN AS CONSTITUTING LEGITIMATE JUDGING
In the above cases, the fact that a judicial decision is painful
is taken to confirm that the decision is legally legitimate—indeed,
its legal legitimacy is if anything more unimpeachable precisely
because it is painful. To be clear, I do not indict any of the judges
or commenters listed above for their observation that a painful,
seemingly unjust decision may nonetheless be the legally correct
one. Judges, after all, are not supposed to simply dispense justice,
even in circumstances where there is widespread agreement
regarding what “justice” would entail.49 To the contrary, as
Herbert Wechsler observes, “[i]t is the duty [of the judge] to
decide the litigated case and to decide it in accordance with the
law.”50 If, contra my reading of Judge Kopf above,51 there is to be
a good yet happy judge, it is the judge who finds contentment in
not deciding cases based on straightforward applications of their
own interest and pleasure.52 On this note, the Supreme Court has
been emphatic, and correctly so, in insisting that “courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. . . . We refuse to
sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation’ . . . .”53
Some of the time, hopefully a large portion of the time, deciding
in accordance with law will also yield just outcomes. But
sometimes it will not—and that mismatch is baked into the
foundation of legitimate judicial practice.
Yet it is precisely because this truth is a truth that we
encounter a risk. The logic above at most suggests that painful
decisions are a signal, a heuristic, for legitimate, lawful judging—
they do not constitute lawful judging. But bereft of other modes of
validation, this can easily be confused. Where pain is the primary

49. See generally Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”: Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82
VA. L. REV. 111 (1996) (discussing lessons learned from Learned Hand’s story about
telling Justice Holmes to “do justice”).
50. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1959).
51. See supra text surrounding note 2.
52. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 634 (2000) (comparing the practice of judging
with playing chess).
53. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963); see also Confirmation Hearing,
supra note 46, at 274 (“[I]t is my [Gorsuch’s] job to respect in part the boundaries of [the
judicial] branch, and not engage in the temptation to legislate through the cloak of a
judicial robe.”).
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mechanism through which we can conclude with confidence that
a judicial decision is legitimate, the socialization of judicial
legitimation becomes those instances where judges dispense and
feel pain. This is the practice of sadomasochistic judging.
The “pain” in these cases need not be and often is not literal
physical injury. More often it comes in the form of deprivation of
rights, intrusions upon liberty, and letting seemingly manifest
injustices stand. The pain judges experience is typically not
direct—they are not among those who are literally hurt by the
decisions they hand down. In the most immediate sense, they are
the inflictors, not the recipients, of pain (as Justice Thomas
recently quipped—albeit again, likely somewhat in jest”—“I don’t
have a lot of stress . . . I cause stress.”54). But judges nonetheless
feel pained by the fact that they often are the inflictors of pain—
an act they do not intrinsically enjoy.55 What judges do enjoy is
the elusive feeling of judicial legitimation. And judges thus
eventually learn to take pleasure in this pain (of inflicting pain),
because the pain itself signals that they are doing their job
correctly—following the law, not allowing themselves to be
guided simply by their own preferences.
In the realm of sadomasochistic judging, judges (1) take
pleasure from (2) the pain of (3) inflicting pain. This circuitous
route is peculiarly modern in nature. As Nietzsche observed,
modernity eliminated, or at least greatly reduced, the ability to
enjoy cruelty in an unmediated fashion—as in the prince whose
wedding entertainment includes a brutal execution or two.56 The

54. Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Clarence Thomas Perplexed by Retirement
Rumors, BLOOMBERG L. (June 3, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week
/clarence-thomas-perplexed-by-retirement-rumors.
55. See Cover, supra note 2, at 1613 (noting that “for most of us, evolutionary,
psychological, cultural and moral considerations inhibit the infliction of pain on other
people,” but because “legal interpretation is as a practice incomplete without violence—
because it depends upon the social practice of violence for its efficacy—it must be related
in a strong way to the cues that operate to bypass or suppress the psycho-social mechanisms
that usually inhibit people’s actions causing pain and death”).
Surgeons and other medical professionals face considerable distress due to their
profession’s constant requirement that they inflict pain, even if that pain is in ultimate
service of healing. “One surgeon who participated in discussions about the suffering of the
healer identified this threat as a major reason many surgeons retire early. They cannot go
on inflicting the pain and bodily damage that healing requires. . . . It is painful to inflict
pain upon another.” John Rowe, The Suffering of the Healer, 38 NURSING F. 16, 18 (2003).
56. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS 198 (Francis Golffing trans., 1956).
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modern pleasure in cruelty comes more indirectly—it is a step
removed—and emerges instead from one’s willing selfsubjugation to the horrors one inflicts. Forbidden from enjoying
the act of killing itself, the executioner instead takes pride in their
commitment to their duty when carrying out an act as dreadful as
an execution.57
Stephen D. Smith contends that judges are rendered “mute”
when faced with a manifestly unjust (or ridiculous) law that they
believe is nonetheless constitutional. They can protest, as in
Griswold, that it is an “uncommonly silly” (Justice Stewart) or
“nutty” (Judge Bork) law, but this utterance is not at all legal—it
is a “personal protest which, on the plane of legal discourse,
lacked significance.”58 What this misses is how the act of protest—
indeed, the genuine emotive sensation that the decision needs to
be protested—is actually doing something quite important as a
means of validating the legal judgment.
For judges, pain—unto others, unto self—offers a particular
form of relief from the anxiety of judicial delegitimization, and
thus is pursued as an analgesic. Whereas nominally the link
between judicial legitimacy and painful decisions is only one of
compatibility—a painful or unjust decision isn’t necessarily a
wrongful one—sadomasochistic judging encourages judges to
actively value those decisions which cause pain. Unsurprisingly,
this may make them susceptible to erring on the side of pain,
preferring the painful outcome to the fair or the just, even in
circumstances where the latter may well have the better of the
purely legal argument.59
To call this dynamic of judicial pain being converted into and
constitutive of judicial pleasure sadomasochistic is not to call it
sociopathic. The mechanics of the conversion are far more
57. See James Miller, Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty, 18 POL.
THEORY 470, 475–76 (1990).
58. Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113, 125
(1988).
59. Daniel Greenwood notes that a similar phenomenon seems to occur in the
corporate world, where directors and managers instructed to ruthlessly prioritize
“shareholder value” over all else may mistakenly believe that a given strategy prioritizes
shareholder value precisely because it is ruthless, and likewise dismiss courses of action
which redound to the benefit of, say, employees or the public as incompatible with their
fiduciary duties even when they are in fact perfectly viable, profitable business models.
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 773, 780–808 (2004).
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complex than simply desiring pain for its own sake.60 To begin, it
is a mistake to think that people (judges and otherwise) simply
avoid pain. In many—albeit usual special—circumstances, pain
can be and is affirmatively sought out, and can even bring about
its own form of pleasure.61 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
Freud discusses patients who seem to desire the repeated replay
of experiences they know will be painful for them: “[p]atients
repeat all of these unwanted situations and painful emotions in
the transference and revive them with the greatest ingenuity.
They seek to bring about the interruption of the treatment while
it is still incomplete; they contrive once more to feel themselves
scorned, to oblige the physician to speak severely to them and
treat them coldly.”62 “None of these things can have produced
pleasure in the past, and it might be supposed that they would
cause less unpleasure today if they emerged as memories or
dreams instead of taking the form of fresh experiences. They are
of course the activities of instincts intended to lead to satisfaction;
but no lesson has been learnt from the old experience of these
activities having led instead only to unpleasure. In spite of that,
they are repeated, under pressure of a compulsion.”63 This leads
to Freud’s resurrection of masochism as a genuine phenomenon

60. Discussing sexual sadomasochism, Patrick Hopkins distinguishes between a
“simulation” versus a “replication”—akin to the difference between acting out a scene in
a movie versus committing a “copycat” crime. Desiring the former need not be simply a
poor substitute for the latter—for example, one can enjoy roller coasters for simulating the
adrenaline rush and danger of plummeting to earth at great speeds, while not actually
wanting to experience the “reality” of it. Patrick D. Hopkins, Rethinking Sadomasochism:
Feminism, Interpretation, and Simulation, 9 HYPATIA 116, 125–26 (1994).
That said, there are important dissimilarities between judicial sadomasochism and
bedroom S&M. Sexual S&M is consensual—not just in an abstract, stipulated way, but
often in a highly technical and layered way. “Safe words” allow the sub to regulate or even
dictate the action; they are able to choose and even critique the performance of the
“master” or dominator. Id. at 123–24. Note how these rationales do not extend to the
judicial context, where the pain inflicted is quite real, not “simulated,” there are no safe
words which can call a halt to the action, and “consent,” if it exists at all, comes from an
extremely abstract and attenuated “consent of the governed.”
61. See Leo Bersani, Foucault, Freud, Fantasy, and Power, 2 GLQ 11, 20 (1995)
(citing Geoff Mains, The Molecular Anatomy of Leather, in LEATHER FOLK: RADICAL
SEX, PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND PRACTICE 37–43 (Mark Thompson ed., 1991)) (“The pain
so-called masochists enjoy is actually pleasure. They have simply found ways to transform
stimuli generally associated with the production of pain into stimuli that set off intense
processes identified as pleasurable.”).
62. SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 43 (James Strachey
trans., 1959).
63. Id. at 43–44.
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and eventually to his famous “death instinct”—a desire to move
back towards simplicity and the relief of tension (death being the
ultimate “simple” state).64
Pain thus offers relief from a different, less tolerable source
of pain. “Pain and suffering are sought, but only to avoid, evade,
control, or master even more serious suffering or painful
traumata.”65 For a Supreme Court Justice, the more serious
trauma would be the sense of acting tyrannically or unlawfully,
the anxiety around the Justice’s seemingly limitless freedom to
simply “count to five.” The painful decision offers relief in the
sense that it supposedly can confirm for the judge that this
decision, at least, was not the product of their own whim and
caprice—they can be confident in its lawfulness precisely because
they abhor it as a matter of politics or ethics.
Yet even under the paradigm of sadomasochistic judging,
pain can only legitimize under a particular frame where the judge
is assumed to be pained by the pain—it is not what they desire, it
is what they are compelled to do as against their underlying
desire.66 Pure sadism won’t do the trick. If it is believed (perhaps
notwithstanding their own protestations) that judges actually do
want to hurt racial minorities, women, gays and lesbians,
transgender individuals, the poor, and so on, then their acts
inflicting pain will not legitimize but delegitimize—this is just a
(particularly vicious) iteration of the dangers of “counting to
five.”67 It is only when judges are (perceived to be) themselves
wounded that their infliction of pain legitimizes their action.
Judges thus come to desire real pain, the pain they desire is pain
that is recognized by all—including themselves—as pain.

64. Id. at 48–50; see also SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
103–11 (Joan Riviere trans., 1958).
65. Harold P. Blum, Sadomasochism in the Psychoanalytic Process, Within and
Beyond the Pleasure Principle: Discussion, 39 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N 431, 434
(1991).
66. Cf. Gary F. Greif, Freedom of Choice and the Tyranny of Desire, 27 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 187, 193 (1993) (noting that we sometimes “desire that some of our desires
dominate us. We desire this so strongly as to be dominated by the desire to be dominated.
I desire to be unable to satisfy a desire to kill someone who inflames my anger. I desire, in
other words, to control those desires which I judge capable of leading me beyond civilized
into barbaric behavior.”).
67. And it is worth noting here that it is a common tactic of abusers—those who are
truly sadistic—to nonetheless claim that they are only acting, regrettably, under
compulsion: “Why are you making me do this to you?” or “I hate that I have to do this.”

SCHRAUB 35:3

2020]

12/29/2020 11:21 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

459

Moreover, simple policy disagreement isn’t enough to render
a judicial decision painful.68 As Fallon notes, judges frequently
and with little consternation uphold, say, tax policy even if they
personally feel that taxes are too high or too low. Judges “know
they lack constitutional grounds to reject most if not all of the laws
that they disagree with” (p. 94). Hence, more is required to
harness the legitimating quality of a painful decision—it must be
viscerally hurtful in some way, triggering intense feelings that the
prevailing outcome is not just wrong in an abstract, technical, or
debatable sense, but wrong on a deeper, more fundamental
ethical register.
Fallon does suggest a limit on this logic. He thinks that a truly
disastrous judicial decision—one that “would plunge millions into
poverty or the economy into chaos, or [would] upset settled social
and political expectations with no plausible basis in the
Constitution’s text or history for doing so”—“almost surely would
not stick” (p. 116). Perhaps this is true—but notice even Fallon
relies upon a crutch: “no plausible basis in the Constitution’s text
or history.”69 One can hardly claim credit for making a particular
ruling where there was no plausible basis as a matter of legal
interpretation for deciding otherwise. But ironically, the painful
route may thus be more attractive and more legitimizing if there
is a plausible legal pathway to avoid inflicting the pain. In cases
where there is a “plausible legal basis” pointing in either
direction, the painful consequences of the court’s decision may be
thought to further legitimate it as a question of law, and declining
to succumb to the plausible legal “out” is even more
demonstrative of the judge’s commitment to following the law
wherever it leads. Even if we agree with Fallon and admit that the
fully cataclysmic decisions likely will be avoided by all judges
(“legitimated” by pain or not), that still leaves a wide range of
cases that are not quite so apocalyptic but still could register
significant painful injustices—and in that arena judges may find
the pleasures of pain more difficult to resist.
68. This tracks distinctions we draw in non-judicial policy disputes as well—not every
political controversy is “painful” in the sense that the prospect of the wrong side prevailing
is felt as an outright injustice or cruelty.
69. Later in the same paragraph, Fallon draws the same connection: “The Court,” he
concedes “can make, and has made, highly unpopular decisions. But it has not so far
created havoc or issued rulings that lack any plausible constitutional foundation” (p. 116,
emphasis added).
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Ironically, given the attention paid to the “frozen trucker”
case, a different Judge Gorsuch dissent while on the 10th Circuit
aptly encapsulates both horns of the sadomasochistic judging
dilemma. In A.M. v. Holmes, Judge Gorsuch dissented from a
ruling giving qualified immunity to a police officer who arrested a
middle schooler for fake burps in gym class.70 In Gorsuch’s view,
it was clear that the relevant statute could not encompass mere
“noises or diversions,” and so the officer should have been on
notice that the arrest was unlawful.71 But Judge Gorsuch did not
accuse the majority of being indifferent to the seeming injustice
foisted upon a thirteen-year-old student whose childish prank was
met with a criminal charge. To the contrary, he wrote that
a judge who likes every result he reaches is very likely a bad
judge, reaching for results he prefers rather than those the law
compels. So it is I admire my colleagues today, for no doubt
they reach a result they dislike but believe the law demands—
and in that I see the best of our profession and much to admire.
It’s only that, in this particular case, I don’t believe the law
happens to be quite as much of a ass as they do.72

Here we see the difficulty of sadomasochistic judging at its
fullest. On the one hand, there is the stated admiration of his
colleagues for taking the painful route, reaching “a result they
dislike but believe the law demands.” On the other hand, there is
the undertone that in their zeal to be so admirably bound by the
law, the judges in the majority ended up reaching a result that
actually defied the relevant legal rules. The pursuit of pain as a
marker of legal legitimation can, if not carefully attended to, lead
to judicial decisions that are neither lawful nor just.
III. OUR SADOMASOCHISTIC JUDICIARY
And so we are back to where we started from, but in reverse.
Judges, terrified of doing whatever they will, desire nothing more
than that their rulings be thought to stem from naught but the
law—a desire that is most obviously effectuated through pain.
This desire becomes the new driver of the judicial will, and soon
judges are actively pursuing and praising the infliction of pain—
70. A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2016).
71. Id. at 1169 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Silva, 525 P.2d 903, 907
(N.M. Ct. App. 1974)).
72. Id. at 1170.
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all the more so in cases where the pain is unnecessary, where it is
not clearly compelled by the law. The very rhetoric of the judiciary
as bound and constrained by law becomes an impetus for judges
to seek out the opportunity to inflict pain for its own sake.
This is the grim era of sadomasochistic judging. Is it our era?
There are worrisome signs. The Supreme Court, and its backers
in the legal profession, have in the Trump era seemed to perceive
the excesses of the administration as if anything counseling greater
deference to the political branches enacting the cruelties.
Shielding President Trump and Trumpists from legal
accountability becomes itself the hill upon which the banner of
legal responsibility must be planted—not in spite of but because
of the genuine revulsion at the administration’s policies.
Defending the constitutionality of the “Muslim Ban,” Josh
Blackman insisted that “I vigorously oppose the president’s
immigration orders as a matter of policy.”73 But, he continued, he
also objected to courts seeking “to peer into the president’s
psyche” in order to ascertain if he was motivated by invidious
intent. The acknowledged wrongfulness of President Trump’s
policy seemed to motivate an especially strong need to defend him
against overzealous judicial checks. “[I]t doesn’t matter if Trump
is somehow different than his predecessors, or if he insults judges
in a shocking breach of Oval Office decorum. The judiciary
should not abandon its traditional role simply because the
president has abandoned his.”74 Jeffrey Toobin expressed a
similar worry: relying on statements by the President which
seemed to show he was motivated by anti-Muslim animus “leads
to a peculiar and unsettling possibility: that an identical order
would be upheld if Barack Obama had issued it, but that this one
was invalidated because Trump was the author.” Toobin
concluded that while Trump represents an “extreme example” of
a politician who make “foolish statements or outright mistakes,”
courts should “reject the use of Presidential statements
altogether” when assessing the legality of presidential actions.
“The Muslim ban is either constitutional or it’s not—and Donald

73. Josh Blackman, Why Courts Shouldn’t Try to Read Trump’s Mind, POLITICO
MAG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/why-courtsshouldnt-try-to-read-trumps-mind-214921.
74. Id.
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Trump’s words on the campaign trail don’t settle that question
one way or the other.”75
There is something peculiar about this objection. After all,
there’s actually not anything unusual about courts probing state
of mind to establish evidence of discriminatory intent. Indeed,
that’s built into the very foundations of our anti-discrimination
law regime—much to the consternation of many liberal
commentators who wish for more objective metrics centered
around the tangible impact government policies have against
vulnerable outgroups to replace a subjective quest for malign
motives. Nonetheless, under current law, if an employer sends an
email to her employee saying “you’re fired,” the relevant antidiscrimination question is whether the employer was motivated
by discriminatory animus. If the boss had repeatedly promised she
was going to implement a “complete shutdown” on minority
employment at her firm, that insight into her psyche would play a
very significant role in any ensuing litigation. An employer who
had written the same note to the same employee, but who had
exhibited no such indicia of prejudicial bias, would fare
considerably better.
But the implicit worry here seems to be that judges are
deriving special rules stemming from Trump’s especially
outrageous conduct, jerry-rigged in order to correct his injustice.76
The result of this logic is that judicial decisions which check
seemingly abusive or shocking conduct by the Trump
administration become more suspect, while those which affirm or
step out of the way of them become testaments to the power of
the rule of law. And it’s a short step from there to thinking that
the rule of law requires heightened deference to Trump
administration actions precisely because they seem, to many
75. Jeffrey Toobin, The Courts and President Trump’s Words, NEW YORKER (Mar.
17, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-courts-and-presidenttrumps-words.
76. This was Justice Thomas’ position in Department of Commerce v. New York,
concerning the addition of a citizenship question to the census: the inference by the district
court and the Supreme Court majority that the purported justification for the addition—
enforcing the Voting Rights Act—was pretextual “was transparently based on the
application of an administration-specific standard.” 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id. at 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“[A] judge predisposed to distrust the Secretary or the
administration could arrange those facts on a corkboard and—with a jar of pins and a spool
of string—create an eye-catching conspiracy web.”).
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judges and legal elites, to be unnecessarily cruel, painful, or
malicious.
Trump v. Hawaii does not stand alone—indeed, it is not even
the most obvious case. Stephen Vladeck has observed how the
Supreme Court’s “shadow docket”—cases which seek emergency
or extraordinary relief from the Supreme Court, outside the
normal and orderly pathways of litigation—has exploded since
President Trump took office.77 These cases stand out because they
represent discretionary interventions in ongoing matters of
litigation, in circumstances where the Supreme Court has
historically kept a very light hand. But the Trump administration
has been remarkably successful in, for example, securing stays of
lower court injunctions pending litigation without even awaiting
the conclusion of a trial, let alone the appellate process.
Remarking on one such stay, nullifying (without substantive
comment) an injunction against administration rules drastically
restricting the right of refugees to apply for asylum in the United
States unless they had previously applied for and been denied
asylum in any country they had traveled through to reach
America,78 Justice Sotomayor observed that “[u]nfortunately, it
appears the Government has treated this exceptional mechanism
[of a stay pending appeal] as a new normal. Historically, the
Government has made this kind of request rarely; now it does so
reflexively.”79 And the Supreme Court seems willing to play
along.
While not involving the Trump administration, Dunn v. Ray
seems to also be part of this trend.80 In Dunn, the Supreme Court
stepped in to vacate a stay imposed by the Eleventh Circuit on an
Alabama execution of a Muslim inmate where the state wouldn’t
allow an Islamic chaplain to be present. By a 5–4 vote, the
Supreme Court concluded (again, without any substantive
comment), that the execution could not be blocked because
the inmate allegedly waited too long to seek relief—even though
he had filed his case just five days after the prison warden denied
77. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket,
133 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019) (documenting the Supreme Court’s unprecedented
willingness to entertain petitions for emergency or extraordinary relief from the Trump
administration).
78. Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019).
79. Id. at 5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
80. 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019).
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his request for a chaplain in his own faith tradition.81
Dunn provoked a furious backlash when it came out, even
among conservatives, in its seemingly gratuitous viciousness
towards a religious minority callously denied spiritual comfort as
he approached his execution.82 But what makes Dunn stand out—
and what cries out for an explanation—is why the Court elected
to intervene in the case at all. Three points are especially salient
here:
1) The inmate, Ray, had secured a stay of execution in the Eleventh Circuit. Hence, the Supreme Court was not in a position
where it was being asked to affirmatively step in and enjoin a
potentially unlawful act by the state of Alabama. The path of
least resistance—a decision to do nothing—would have been to
leave the stay intact, and allow the appellate process to operate
as normal. Instead, the Court made an affirmative decision to
“short-circuit[] that ordinary process . . . with little briefing and
no argument.”83
2) The Court rested its decision to vacate the stay based on “the
last-minute nature” of the application.84 But note that in doing
so it was not enforcing a formal rule—for example, that the
claim was time-barred. It was a matter of pure discretion—and
one in which, as noted above, compelling evidence suggested
that Ray had in fact filed his application in a prompt and
timely fashion.
3) The Supreme Court is not a court of general error correction.
Even if the Eleventh Circuit was in error in granting the stay,

81. Id. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Execution Decision Animates Critics
on the Left and Right, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2019, 4:08 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/supreme-courts-executiondecision-animates-critics-on-the-left-and-right/2019/02/11/72da5ed8-2e3a-11e9-813a0ab2f17e305b_story.html; David French, The Supreme Court Upholds a Grave Violation
of the
First Amendment,
NAT’L REV. (Feb. 8, 2019, 2:30 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-supreme-court-upholds-a-grave-violation-ofthe-first-amendment/; Dahlia Lithwick, An Execution Without an Imam, SLATE (Feb. 8,
2019, 2:56 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/domineque-ray-alabamaexecution-imam-first-amendment-scotus.html; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Dunn v. Ray: We
Should Have Seen This Coming, ACS EXPERT F. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org
/expertforum/dunn-v-ray-we-should-have-seen-this-coming/.
83. Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 661 (quoting Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653,
654, (1992) (per curiam)).
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that alone does not compel the Court to review the case (or
even make it particularly likely that the Court would do so).
The question still remains: why was this error deserving of the
Court’s limited time and attention?

Is the answer latent anti-Muslim animus? Perhaps, and
unfortunately in the wake of Trump v. Hawaii that possibility is
less fanciful than one might hope. Another hypothesis, though, is
that the justices recognized and were in some ways repelled by the
decision to deprive a condemned man of spiritual comfort in his
last days—but viewed that revulsion as corrupting proper
“legalistic” judgment. They perceived the Eleventh Circuit as
having indulged due to the extraordinary facts of the case, and felt
it especially important to guard and check against that instinct.
The justices may indeed feel pain at the pain they inflict, but they
will take solace in the fact that it is in the service of their judicial
duty.
To be sure, sadomasochistic instincts do not win out in every
case. The litigation surrounding President Trump’s decision to
rescind DACA, for example, looked as if it might provoke a
similar sort of decision—a conservative majority yielding to the
power of the executive while exhibiting manifest discomfort with
the policy outcome. In course of the DACA litigation, several
prominent conservative voices interceding in favor of unraveling
the limited protections DACA provides to undocumented
immigrant children, even as they publicly (and I believe
genuinely) declare their deep sympathy with the program’s
beneficiaries. Blackman, along with Ilya Shapiro, even went so far
as to file a brief under the unconventional but telling title
“Supporting DACA as a Matter of Policy but Petitioners [seeking
to rescind DACA] as a Matter of Law.”85 And after oral

85. Brief for the CATO Institute and Professor Jeremy Rabkin as Amici Curiae
Supporting DACA as a Matter of Policy but Petitioners as a Matter of Law, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (mem),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-587/113553/20190826102722898_DHS
%20v.%20Regents%20Amicus%20Brief%20-%20Final.pdf.
This brief also demonstrates that the dynamic I am identifying is not reducible to
simple deference to democratic branches. While technically the posture of this brief was in
support of the executive’s authority to “unwind” DACA, the authors make clear that they
also believe (along with the Trump administration) that the DACA program is
substantively unlawful and should be struck down by the judiciary, notwithstanding their
political belief that it is just and wise policy. See id. at 3–4.
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arguments concluded, many observers predicted that this posture
would be reflected in the majority opinion: court-watchers
believed that the conservative justices were poised to allow
DACA to be unwound even as they expressed sympathy for the
immigrant children who would be victimized by their decision.86
When the case was decided however, Chief Justice Roberts
joined the majority finding the DACA rescission unlawful, and a
5–4 decision against the immigrants became a 5-4 decision in their
favor.87 But one can still hear the themes of sadomasochistic
judging reverberating in the language of the dissents. Justice
Kavanaugh used sympathetic language to describe the “millions
of young immigrants who, as children, were brought to the United
States and have lived here ever since,” even as he concluded that
the Trump administration had adequately explained its decision
to strip them of DACA’s protection. The young immigrants, he
wrote at the outset of his opinion, “live, go to school, and work
here with uncertainty about their futures.”88 Justice Thomas for
his part was even more blunt: describing the majority opinion as
“an effort to avoid a politically controversial but legally correct
decision.” “Such timidity,” he continued, “forsakes the Court’s
duty to apply the law according to neutral principles.”89 That the
Court’s decision gave a reprieve to an undeniably sympathetic
class of individuals is, under this view, a glaring sign that the Court
has been derelict in its constitutional duty.
Lower court judges, too, have begun to wear accusations of
injustice as a badge of honor. Such was the case in Jones v. Florida,
where a divided Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the
Florida legislature’s requirement that convicted felons pay any
outstanding fines, fees, or restitution requirements before having
their voting rights restored—even if the state itself could not
reliably determine what those fees were.90 Judge Jordan, at the

86. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Appears Ready to Let Trump End DACA
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/supremecourt-dreamers.html (discussing the Justices’ opinions on ending the DACA program).
Justice Gorsuch, for example, said of the pro-DACA litigants: “I hear a lot of facts,
sympathetic facts, that you’ve put out there, and they speak to all of us.” Id.
87. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
88. Id. at 1932 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
89. Id. 1919 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
90. Jones v. Florida, No. 20-12003, 2020 WL 5493770 (11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2020).
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end of a ninety-two-page dissent, compared the majority opinion
unfavorably to the performance of the Eleventh Circuit’s
predecessor during the civil rights era, when they had insisted on
protecting the constitutional voting rights of unpopular minorities
in the face of sustained and often violent popular opposition. He
concluded that this opinion, by contrast, would not “be viewed as
kindly by history.”91
Chief Judge William Pryor, who wrote the majority opinion,
took the unusual step of writing a separate concurrence to his own
ruling solely to respond to this line. He explained to his dissenting
colleagues that they needed to learn “a difficult truth about the
nature of the judicial role.”92 A judge’s duty, he lectured, “is not
to reach the outcomes we think will please whoever comes to sit
on the court of human history.”93 Rather, it consists of “devotion
to the rule of law and basic morality”—no more and no less.94
The “and basic morality” clause of that passage is an
exception that arguably swallows the rule of the argument. But
we’ll leave that aside.95 What’s most striking about Chief Judge
Pryor’s concurrence is the presumption that, by citing to the
proverbial “court of history,” his dissenting colleagues were
tacitly abandoning the terrain of legal obligation. But why should
this be true? Judge Jordan’s dissent, after all, was perfectly
legalistic in character—if anything, it was distinguished by its
markedly textualist orientation, and indeed he expressly criticizes
members of the majority for abandoning textualist methodology
when “they do not like the result.”96 Those legal failings—
especially when in service to a grim cause like voter suppression—
surely could be ones judged harshly by history’s gaze. But Chief
91. Id. at *68 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at *21 (W. Pryor, C.J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Patrick E. Higginbotham, Conceptual Rigor: A Cabin for the
Rhetoric of Heroism, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1981)).
95. I will only say here that one of the most well-established features of the internal
morality of law is that legal requirements must be made public, in language intelligible to
those purportedly bound by them. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–38
(1969). The fact that Florida cannot even tell prospective voters what sums they are obliged
to pay before registering—but is perfectly willing to re-incarcerate those who guess
wrong—arguably fails even this extraordinarily thin moral requirement. See Jones, 2020
WL 5493770, at *57 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (expressing incredulity at the idea that “a state
can impose a condition for the exercise of a right or privilege, and then refuse to explain
to a person what the condition consists of or how to satisfy it”).
96. Id. at *64 (observing that “[i]f that is textualism, textualism is a mirage”).
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Judge Pryor seemed to view the consonance between ethical and
legal obligation as presumptively suspect; the fact of the former
serves to discredit the latter.97
Chief Judge Pryor does not, to be clear, attack the decisions
of his predecessors combating Jim Crow. Indeed, he characterizes
those judges as “heroic.”98 But one might ask on what basis does
he believe this “heroic” assessment is justified? Surely, it is not
solely that these judges obeyed the law—most judges, one hopes,
do that most of the time, without any particular valor or
distinction. Equally surely, it is not that they flouted the law in
service of their own moral code—these decisions were not lawless.
What was heroic about the judges who rallied against Jim Crow
voting restrictions is that the judges followed the law, and
corrected grotesque injustices, notwithstanding powerful forces
which insisted they had no right to do either.
Sadomasochistic judging turns this history on its head. It
assumes that the only true instances of judicial bravery are cases
where judges permit, experience, and facilitate pain in martyrdom
to the rule of law. The easiest thing in the world for a judge to do,
under this theory, is to expedite justice—it is so easy that judges
need to be conditioned to do the opposite. But this is simply not
true. Judges confronted with the obvious legal infirmities of the
Jim Crow regime could nonetheless have easily hid behind the
judiciary’s constrained role as mere administrators of “the rule of
law in courts of limited jurisdiction,”99 or the need to “respect the
political decisions made by the people of Florida and their
officials.”100 Many urged them to do just that; many harshly
indicted them as lawless tyrants for not doing just that.101 The
lesson of the struggle against Jim Crow in the courts is that, some
of the time, correcting even evident wrongs that flout clear
97. Blackman, favorably quoting Chief Judge Pryor’s concurrence, stated that “when
I hear the phrase ‘court of history’ or ‘arc of history,’ I simply presume that a liberal is
trying to shame a conservative into reaching a liberal result. These phrases no longer have
any meaning for me.” Josh Blackman, There Is No Court of History, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 12, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/09/12/there-is-no-court-of-history/.
98. See Jones, 2020 WL 5493770, at *21 (Pryor, C.J., concurring) (“Our dissenting
colleagues predict that our decision will not be ‘viewed as kindly by history’ as the votingrights decisions of our heroic predecessors.”).
99. Id. (quoting Higginbotham, supra note 94, at 1343).
100. Id.
101. See William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study
of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 492–97 (2002).
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constitutional commands is an act requiring great judicial
courage. The lesson of the present moment is that some judges
will fail to recognize these obvious legal violations not in spite, but
because of the manifest injustices they accompany.
CONCLUSION
Speaking in defense of then-Judge Gorsuch’s rulings in the
“frozen trucker” case and other like rulings, Senator Thom Tillis
remarked that “[o]ne thing I like about you [Gorsuch] is
sometimes your decisions seem to make everybody mad, which
probably means it is a pretty good decision.”102 Like Justice
Brennan’s quip about counting to five votes, it was no doubt
meant somewhat tongue-in-cheek. But also like Justice Brennan’s
statement, it gets to something important and somewhat
disconcerting. It suggests that judges are trustworthy to the extent
they make us mad, to the extent that they hurt us—and the more
that they hurt us the more they should be trusted.
The great philosopher, Judith Shklar, in her famous essay
“Putting Cruelty First,”103 speaks of the deep troubles that lie in
the seemingly liberal position that ranks cruelty as the single worst
vice: it “makes political action difficult beyond endurance, may
cloud our judgment, and may reduce us to a debilitating
misanthropy and even to a resort to moral cruelty.”104 So to
reiterate once more: any theory of legal legitimation that locates
proper judicial interpretation in something other than a judge’s
independent moral judgment has to leave open the possibility that
a judge must, in adherence to the law, endorse a cruel decision.
Judges cannot put cruelty first. But what they can choose to do,
and may be at serious risk of doing, is elevate cruelty—precisely
because it is cruel, and recognized as cruel and understood to be
cruel—into its own form of ecstasy. The more one hates cruelty,
the more one is convinced of one’s own righteousness for
tolerating it. And then—the more cruelty one tolerates, the more
confident one can be in one’s status as a legitimate judge.
One way of resolving this dilemma is to find a knockdown
theory of correct legal interpretation that can decisively inform us

102. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 46, at 235–36.
103. Judith N. Shklar, Putting Cruelty First, in ORDINARY VICES 7–44 (1984).
104. Id. at 43.
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which decisions are lawful and which are not, and which can
compel our obedience—damn the consequences. But, as Fallon
compellingly demonstrates, we cannot have this and likely would
not want it. And so here, finally, Fallon’s reflective equilibrium
may well exercise a stabilizing influence. The problem of
sadomasochistic judging assumes that the most serious threat to
rule of law is the judge who flinches away from the cruel acts he
or she must impose. Yet, as we’ve seen, this instinct, if carried too
far, can generate a far graver risk—the judge who instead leans in
to the cruelty, learns to seek it out and revel in it, precisely
because they hate it. The reflective equilibrium mechanic does not
abolish pain from judging. But it does offer a safety valve allowing
judges to consider—legitimately consider—whether the pain they
are dispensing is truly necessary to the service of the law.

